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A commentary on
The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles
by Bonnefon, J.-F., Shariff, A., and Rahwan, I. (2016). Science 352, 1573–1576. doi: 10.1126/science.
aaf2654
An autonomous vehicle (AV) car with 1 passenger (e.g., the car owner) inside is traveling within
the speed limit down the road. However, unexpectedly, 10 pedestrians have appeared in its path
and it is too late for the car to brake. The car must either save the passenger by driving into the 10
pedestrians and killing them, or save the 10 pedestrians by swerving into a barrier and killing the
passenger. Should the AV algorithm be programmed to save the passenger, or to save the greater
number of people? This question is of great importance to the AV industry, policy makers, the
potential buyers, and the general public.
Recent research (Bonnefon et al., 2016) has investigated how humans judge the morality of
the two AV algorithms—a utilitarian (saving the greater number of lives; Bentham, 1970) and
a non-utilitarian passenger-protective (saving the passenger). Using moral dilemma scenarios in
which an AV is programed to be utilitarian or passenger-protective, participants were required to
rate (on a 0–100 slider) “what action they thought was the most moral,” Bonnefon et al. (2016)
found that participants rated the utilitarian algorithm (e.g., sacrificing 1 passenger to save 10
pedestrians) as the moral course of action. However, when the respondents were asked to rate
on a scale the likelihood of buying a car with each of the algorithms (to what extent they are
inclined), they indicated higher likelihood of purchasing the passenger-protective algorithm than
the utilitarian one. This surprising result demonstrates what appears to be a social dilemma—an
agent temptation to act in accordance with self-interest (Bonnefon et al., 2016), which often results
in the worst outcome for all individuals involved, including the decision-maker (Dawes, 1980;
Kollock, 1998). The authors have not explained theoretically the results from this social dilemma;
yet they discounted the possibility of uncertainty (e.g., the possibility that people may not be aware
or have access to the utilitarian actions and their consequences; Kusev et al., 2016; Zhao et al.,
2016). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide an insight (theoretical andmethodological) and
explanation for the surprising reversals of the moral utilitarian preferences reported in Bonnefon
et al. (2016).
Here, we argue that methodological issues in Bonnefon’s et al. (2016) research may have induced
uncertainty amongst participants. Accordingly, it is plausible that the difference in response to
the two questions (what action they thought was the most moral, and to what extent are they
are inclined to purchase an AV with each algorithm) is caused by the restricted accessibility of
moral utilitarian information. For example, respondents may not realize that a car purchaser is
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also inevitably a pedestrian too. We suggest that full utilitarian
descriptions provide accessibility to utilitarian tasks and their
consequences and can eliminate the conflicting responses to these
two questions.
Psychological uncertainty has been found to account for
respondents’ differences in utilitarian choice for morally sensitive
scenarios (Kusev et al., 2016); comprehensive moral tasks and
questions reduced decision uncertainty and boosted utility
maximization. Kusev et al. (2016) argued that in moral decision-
making tasks (the trolley and footbridge dilemma; Thomson,
1985; Greene et al., 2001) participants are given (i) a partial
moral task description which outlines what will happen should
they throw the switch/push the stranger, and (ii) asked a partial
appropriateness of action question for only one of the two
possible moral actions (yes/no answers). Hence, the respondents
are left to infer what will happen should they refrain from this
action and asked to judge the appropriateness of only one of
the actions. Thus, the moral dilemma and question contain only
“partial utilitarian descriptions,” inducing uncertainty.
Accordingly, we argue that all of the scenarios presented by
Bonnefon et al. (2016) contained partial utilitarian information,
inducing decision uncertainty amongst respondents. For
instance, in some of the scenarios each respondent is required to
imagine themselves as a passenger inside the car and are therefore
presented with only one side of the situation. We propose that
if the respondents imagine themselves as pedestrians as well,
uncertainty may be reduced as respondents would be able to
access both possibilities—being a passenger and a pedestrian.
For instance, being in the car and benefiting from the passenger-
protective algorithm does not expose the respondents to the
greater danger/risk of other cars employing the same algorithm
when they are not in the car (e.g., as pedestrians).
In addition to the partial information in the scenarios
presented by Bonnefon et al. (2016), we further argue that the
questions the authors claim to produce conflicting results in
studies 3, 4, and 6 do not fully account for the willingness
to buy an AV car. In the experiments participants were
presented with a moral scenario where an AV can either be
programmed to be utilitarian, passenger-protective, or select
either option at random. This scenario was followed by questions,
one of which required the participants to rate their relative
willingness to buy an AV for themselves—“How would you rate
your relative willingness of having an AV with each of these
algorithms?.” The results revealed that participants preferred
to purchase the passenger-protective AV, which once again
conflicted with their general preference for utilitarian AV. Due
to this conflict, our ongoing research aims to comprehensively
understand utilitarian behavior by providing respondents with
two moral questions regarding their willingness to purchase
an AV, and their willingness for other people to purchase
an AV:
“Please rate how willing you would be to purchase an AV that
is programmed with each of these algorithms”
and
“Please rate how willing you would be for other people
to purchase an AV that is programmed with each of these
algorithms.”
It is plausible that full accessibility to moral tasks and
questions reduces decision uncertainty and maximizes utility in
moral decision-making with AVs. In our proposal, we argue that
utility maximization can be increased by enabling participants to
imagine themselves as not only as a passenger of an AV, but also
as a pedestrian, and measure their judgments appropriately.
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